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Erika Brown
Oklahoma State University

Fixed or Flexible: The Effect of
Negative Feedback on One's
Religious Identity

The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of negative feedback
on self-reported religious identity among Christian students. After initially
rating themselves on a computer-administered continuous scale ranging from
as religious as possible to not at all religious, participants completed a
difficult Bible trivia quiz and received negative feedback regarding their
performance. The participants were then made to believe that their initial
computer ratings had been lost, and were asked to rate themselves a second
time. Individuals also completed the Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale
and were divided into high and low religiosity groups. Statistical analyses
revealed that participants were consistent in their pre- and post-ratings
despite the negative feedback on the quiz; low and high religiosity groups
were equally consistent. The results therefore suggest that self-reported
religiosity is a resilient construct. Given the low level of statistical power of this
study, however, more research is needed before more definitive conclusions
can be drawn.

The question is not whether people identify
themselves as religious or not, but rather, if this selfproclaimed title is fixed or flexible in the face of
some negative event. It is all-to-common to hear
stories of individuals who, in the face of difficulty,
throw in the towel and turn away from the very
beliefs once held so strongly. Within the Christian
faith alone, arguably one of the most well-known
examples follows Jesus' arrest, when the disciple
Peter denied knowing Jesus three times (Luke
22:54-62, New International Version). Moreover,
later in the third century, early Christians faced
persecution under the emperor Decius and
thousands lapsed in their faith. Even today, it is
common for individuals experiencing bereavement to
re-evaluate, question, or doubt one's religious

understanding or worldview (Tedeschi, 2006).
Stories such as the young Cassie Bernal' (who,
before being shot at Columbine in 1999, was asked
if she believed in God, to which she is reported to
have replied "yes"), while inspiring to some, are rare
and shocking to others.
Religiosity, here, is defined as how one perceives
himself or herself as a religious person; including
both activities associated with an organized religion
or community, such as attending a religious service,
and activities that are more subtle or personal, such
as praying or committing random acts of
benevolence in the name of faith, specifically
focusing on Christianity. Is it true, then, that one's
religiosity fluctuates in the face of challenges? If so,
who is affected by this change, those with high or
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low religiosity? This is an important question that
has been overlooked in the prior literature. Previous
literature has focused primarily on the influence of
negative events on one's overall self-esteem, rather
than applying it specifically to religiosity. For
example, DeHart and Pelham (2007) looked at the
effects of daily negative events on fluctuations in
state implicit self-esteem. They found that
individuals, who had low self-concepts, showed
decreases in state implicit self-esteem following
negative experiences, whereas individuals who had
high self-concepts, maintained a stable implicit selfesteem.
A study by Kernis, Grannemann, and Barclay
(1992) examined how the stability of self-esteem
might factor in the process of excuse making
following feedback on a test in a course. One
hundred and thirty-eight undergraduate psychology
students completed several self-esteem measures
about two weeks into the semester, including
Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale, the Rosenberg's
Stability Scale, the overgeneralization subscale of the
Attitudes Toward Self Scale, the Crowne-Marlowe
Social Desirability Scale and the Self-Validation
Scale. About one week later, the students stated the
lowest grade they would be happy with on the first
test and filled out the Need for Cognition Scale.
Two weeks later, students received feedback of
success (i.e, a score equal to or above the stated
score) or failure (i.e, a score lower than the stated
score) on the first test. Students were then given
materials that included measures of excuse making
behaviors. The results showed unstable high selfesteemed participants were more likely to make
excuses following success (positive feedback) but
not failure (negative feedback), whereas unstable
low self-esteemed participants were more likely to
make excuses following a failure rather than a
success.
More recently, Abela and Taylor (2003)
examined the moderating role of self-esteem on
depressive mood reactions in schoolchildren. During
the first assessment, third and seventh grade children
filled out questionnaires regarding depressive mood,
self-criticism, dependency and self-esteem. Six
weeks later a second assessment took place, during
which measures for depressive mood and negative

events were administered. The results showed that
high self-criticism and negative events lead to an
increase in depressive moods for the children with
low self-esteem, but not for those children with high
self-esteem. Consequently, the researchers stated:
"the results of this study suggest that high levels of
self-esteem may buffer children with high levels of
self-criticism against such reactions" as depressive
moods (p. 416). In other words, children with high
self-esteem were unaffected by self-criticism, but
children with low self-esteem suffered the
consequence of developing a depressive mood.
When the literature discusses religiosity
specifically, much of the attention is focused on
whether maintaining spiritual beliefs is correlated to a
higher level of emotional well-being or a better
quality of life. Hodges (2002) makes the argument
that an emotionally healthy adult is one who leads
"an active spiritual life, who finds meaning and
purpose in life and who operates from an intrinsic
value system that guides [his or her] life's work and
decisions" (p. 114). Intrinsic values involve an
orientation toward religion that is neither self-serving,
nor influenced by peer pressure, but stable across
time and situations; forming the foundation on which
meaning is found in life. This conclusion was met by
looking at four major dimensions of spiritual wellbeing that have been predominantly agreed upon in
the literature; meaning in life, intrinsic values,
transcendence, and community of shared values and
community support.
Elam (2001) used a battery of surveys, including
the Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale and the
SIU Religiosity Scale, to look at whether there was
a relationship between spirituality and religiosity and
positive and/or negative affect. The results showed
spirituality to be positively correlated with positive
affect and negatively correlated with depression and
anxiety. Religiosity was further found to be a
predictor of ones overall life satisfaction. It is
interesting that there is a distinction made between
spirituality and religiosity; both appear to be
separate concepts that overlap.
Keyes and Reitzes (2007) compared the
religious identity of older working and retired adults
to their mental health. They defined religious identity
as "the self meanings attached to a religious role,
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one's faith will progress through over one's lifespan;
however, the process of moving between stages is
somewhat debated. On one side, Fowler (1991)
depicts seven distinct stages of faith development
that an individual progresses through as he or she
ages. Beginning with Primal Faith in infancy, an infant
forms trust and mutuality with a caregiver before the
development of language, which forms the
foundation on which later faith develops. Once the
child is older and in the third stage, Mythical-Literal,
he or she begins to see faith as fulfilling mythical
(emotional) needs, literal (cognitive) needs, both or
neither, as critical thinking skills begin to develop.
The process ends in adulthood with Universalizing
Faith, where the individual's perspective is no longer
centered on the self, but on God.
From the other perspective, Clore and Fitzgerald
(2002) agreed that there is a progression in faith
development; however, they mention a more
succinct four levels (Self-Moral, World Coherence,
Symbolic Function, and Authority), rather than
seven. Also, the method of progression differs
according to Clore and Fitzgerald; they found that
"rather than a sequential set of displacements, faith
involves a progressive integration of new elements
into an existing base" (p. 104). This process is less a
result of one's development and more an intentional
re-evaluation of one's faith.
More closely related to the current research is a
study by Shaffer and Hastings (2007). They looked
at how Catholics high or low in authoritarianism
responded to a threatening or non-threatening essay
about Catholicism with regards to a measure of
religious fundamentalism, amount of doubts
conveyed, and identification with their religious
affiliation. They found that those who read the
threatening essay conveyed fewer doubts, identified
more with their religious affiliation, and supported
religious fundamentalism more than those who read
the neutral essay, especially if they also possessed an
authoritarian personality.
The purpose of this study is rooted in past
research, but the specific issue has not been dealt
with directly. This study will examine the effect of
receiving negative feedback on individuals who
identify themselves as being "high" or "low" on
religiosity. As stated above, religiosity is defined here

religious group, or the way that individuals perceive
themselves as a religious person who holds religious
or spiritual values or beliefs" (p. 435). The sample
consisted of residents of a North Carolina
metropolitan area, who were an average age of 65.
Religious identity (personal attributes, such as
competence, confidence, and sociability as a
religious individual), religiosity (measured as a
response ranging from deeply religious to not at all
religious), along with other activities, such as
attending religious services, reading the Bible and
watching or listening to religious TV or radio
programs were measured. The respondents' mental
health was measured using Rosenberg's 10-item
scale of overall self worth and the Center for
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D).
The findings indicated that one's religious identity
was positively correlated to self-esteem and
negatively to depressive symptoms; however, church
attendance was not.
Interestingly, however, Mullet, Barros, Frongia,
Usai, and Shafighi (2003) found that individuals
were more willing to forgive and less likely to exact
revenge or hold a grudge based primarily on church
attendance, or a social commitment, rather than a
personal belief in God. In a second study, they
included individuals with a greater social
commitment to religion (i.e., priests, nuns) and found
similar results. It appears that although a personal
commitment is indicative of higher emotional wellbeing and lower depressive symptoms, it is the
social, rather than personal, aspect that determines
one's likelihood to forgive others.
Further research has found that higher levels of
spirituality are indicative of improved psychological
adjustment among cancer patients diagnosed within
the previous five years, as seen in reduced stress
and depression levels and increased quality of life
(Laubmeier, Zakowski, & Bair, 2004). These results
were consistent across all forms of cancer,
regardless of how life threatening.
More specific to the interest of the current
research is whether one's religiosity, though it may
consistently exude an array of positive benefits,
changes. The literature seems to be in agreement
that it is part of human nature to look for meaning in
life, and in doing so, there are different stages that
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as how one perceives himself or herself as a religious
person; including both activities associated with an
organized religion or community, such as attending a
religious service, and activities that are more subtle
or personal, such as praying or committing random
acts of benevolence in the name of faith, specifically
focusing on Christianity. For the purpose of the
current study religiosity will be used interchangeably
with religious identity. Negative feedback is defined
as informing individuals of their lack of knowledge,
regarding the beliefs of their faith, after completion of
a difficult Bible quiz. The goal is to investigate if
one's religiosity can be affected in the short term,
after learning that one's performance is sub-par
compared to one's religious peers. Therefore, the
research questions here are: a) Will participants reevaluate the level of their religious identity based on
evidence that contradicts what was originally
believed, or will they hold to their original
convictions?, and b) If negative feedback does result
in a re-evaluation, will there be a difference in how
those originally high or low in religiosity change their
perspectives?
The first research question is specifically
consistent with Clore and Fitzgerald's (2002)
research that individuals intently re-evaluate and
incorporate new pieces of information into their
religious identity. The second question deals more
broadly with research by Shaffer and Hastings
(2007); however, here the idea is that reasonable
and personal feedback is given that, although
negative, is not presented as threatening. Also,
Laubmeier et al. (2004) deal with this question to
some degree, except that, although they find
religiosity to be a flexible trait, their participants are
also dealing with a threatening situation, namely
cancer.
The anticipated outcomes are not entirely in
accordance with the results of the literature reviewed
above. Typically, an individual with high self-esteem
maintains a stable self-esteem or experiences less
distress when faced with a negative event, whereas
an individual with low self-esteem is more likely to
experience a further drop in self-esteem or greater
distress as a consequence. Likewise, when
individuals are threatened, either with an illness or
about their beliefs, they tend to hold more firmly to
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their beliefs and exhibit fewer doubts. However, it is
hypothesized that participants high on religiosity will
have a strong and personal tie to their religious
identity that they consider highly important
(Princeton Religious Research Center, 1996).
Consequently, reasonable negative feedback
regarding one's religiosity would be interpreted as
more distressing to those participants who hold
strong ties to their religious identity than to those
participants who are low on religiosity. This is
specifically because the participants should not feel
threatened and can therefore make a conscious and
honest effort to consider the validity and
consequences of the feedback. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that high religiosity participants should
lower their personal ratings of their religious identity
significantly more than low religiosity participants
after receiving negative feedback.

Method
Participants
Participants in this study received course credit
as compensation for participation. A total of 24
participants, who identified themselves as Christians,
were recruited. There were no restrictions on
specific denominations. The mean age of the
participants was 19.75 years, and 62.5% (n = 15)
were female. The majority were Caucasian (79.2%),
followed by African American (8.3%), Hispanic
(4.2%), Native American (4.2%) and Other (4.2%).
Materials
The Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale
(SIBS) was administered to each participant to
determine religiosity and divide them into the high
and low religiosity groups. This scale is designed to
measure actions as well as beliefs, in order to
achieve a complete measure of religiosity. It consists
of 26 items, scored on a Likert-type scale. It
consists of four main domains (internal beliefs,
external practices, personal application, and
existential and meditative beliefs) with wording that
is general enough to be used within the framework
of most faiths. The SIBS scale has been shown to
yield scores that are reliable and valid. Internal
consistency has yielded a Cronbach's alpha of 0.92,

test-retest reliability of 0.92, and the convergent
construct validity of 0.80 (Hatch, Burg, Naberhaus,
& Hellmich, 1998; Mystakidou, Tsilika, Parpa,
Smyrnioti, & Vlahos, 2007). The top 50% of the
scores made up the high religiosity group and the
bottom 50% of the scores made up the low
religiosity group.
Idiogrid (Grice, 2002) was also used to
administer a personal rating of the participant's
religiosity. Idiogrid is software designed to allow the
researcher to create and analyze repertory grids
using a Dynamic Analog Scale (DAS) (Grice &
Mignogna, 2008). The participant was prompted to
enter the names of five people who fit particular role
titles (viz., mother figure, father figure, a close friend,
a romantic partner, and a person whom he or she
dislikes). Next the participant selected and placed
each name, along with Your Self on an analog scale
ranging from as religious as possible to not at all
religious to create a comparative rating of his or her
self. The possible scale range was from -200 to
+200. A religious person was defined as:
Someone who has or shows a belief in or
reverence for God. This can be exhibited by
taking part in activities, such as attending
religious services, taking part in Eucharist,
reading or studying the Bible, or committing
random acts of kindness. This belief can also be
exhibited in a more subtle manner, such as
praying, forgiving others, show a high level of
ethical responsibility, or using faith in daily life.
A basic knowledge quiz was also administered to
each participant, which consisted of 20 questions
randomly selected from Bob Phillips' Hard Trivia
section from The Awesome Book of Bible Trivia
(2004). It was therefore expected that all
participants would perform very poorly on the quiz.
The quiz contained questions such as naming the
twelve apostles. Lastly, a 100-item Big-Five
personality questionnaire (Goldberg, 1999) was
administered as a distracter task and was not used in
any of the analyses.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a private
room with four computer work stations divided by
privacy panels. They were told that they would be
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participating in a study titled "Religiosity and
Personality" in order to protect the nature of the
study. Participants were first asked to complete a
demographics sheet and the Spiritual Involvement
and Beliefs Scale. Next participants were asked to
turn on the computer monitor, where Idiogrid was
already setup. Each participant completed the first
DAS by providing five names (mother figure, father
figure, a close friend, a romantic partner and a
person whom he or she dislikes) and then
comparatively rating himself or herself on a
continuous scale ranging from as religious as
possible to not at all religious. Upon completion,
participants were moved to an adjacent computer
station, separated by a privacy panel. The
experimenter handed the participant the Bible quiz to
complete. If participants asked what to do on
unknown questions, they were told they could either
guess or leave it blank. As much time was provided
as the participants needed (typically no more than 710 minutes).
While the participant worked on the quiz, the
experimenter saved the DAS ratings; however, the
experimenter also began a ruse. Specifically, while
saving the DAS ratings, the experimenter exclaimed
"Oh shoot!" and then remained silent while pressing
several random keys on the keyboard to mimic
computer activity. Once the participant completed
the quiz, any comments about his or her
performance were politely deflected by asking the
participant to turn on the computer monitor
(participants were still adjacent to the work station
where the first DAS ratings were completed). They
were then asked to complete the personality
inventory (already set up on the computer).
The experimenter then graded the Bible quiz,
marking wrong answers with a red marker and
writing the number correct (i.e., 2/20) at the top and
circling it. Once the participant finished with the
personality inventory, he or she received negative
feedback using the following script:
Thanks! Normally, this is the end of the study,
but... I hate to ask this... could you please
complete the computer ratings again? Dr. X
[professor's name] is going to kill me... but I
accidentally deleted your first ratings. It will
only take a few minutes.

All participants agreed to complete the ratings again,
and the following statements were made:
Great! Thanks, I really appreciate it. While I set
up the file, you can look over your Bible quiz.
I'm afraid, as you might have guessed, you
didn't do very well. You only got (#) of the
items right. We've found that most Christians
actually tend to get at least 12 of the 20 items
right.
Any questions or comments made by the participant
were politely deflected, and the experimenter
continued setting up the file (15-20 seconds). The
participants then completed the DAS for the second
time on the computer. This minor deception was
necessary to reduce the demand characteristics of
the experiment; namely that the change in rating was
what was of interest. Specifically, making the
participants believe that the previous rating was lost
should have allowed them to feel comfortable
changing their rating upon receiving negative
feedback without feeling restricted by their initial
rating. IRB approval for this deception was both
sought and attained prior to any participants' taking
part in the study.
Lastly, all participants were debriefed regarding
the purpose and nature of the study, specifically
discussing the necessity of the deception used. A
written debriefing statement was read with them and
any questions were answered. Given that the mild
deception needed to be protected from future
participants, the participants did not receive a copy
of the debriefing statement.

Results
The difference between the participants' DAS
rating of the self at Time 1 and Time 2 was analyzed
with a matched-pairs t test. Time 2 (M= 109.92,
SD = 56.02) ratings did decrease slightly from Time
1 (M= 122.08, SD = 44.93), but this difference
was not statistically significant, t(23) = 1.79,
p= .086, two-tailed. Although the mean difference.
was small (Mdiff = 12.17, SDdiff = 33.25, d = .24),
the effect was in the predicted direction, indicating
that overall participants decreased their religiosity
rating by an average of roughly 12 points (on a -200
to 200 point scale) after receiving negative feedback

on quiz performance. The 95% confidence interval
was fairly narrow (-1.87 to 26.21) on the 400 point
scale.
There was one outlier, with a decrease from Time
1 to Time 2 of 109 points. Removing this extreme
score, the data were analyzed again with another
matched pairs t test. Time 2 (M= 114.70,
SD = 52.04) still decreased slightly from Time 1
(M= 122.65, SD = 45.85), but this difference also
was not statistically significant, t(22) =1.43,
p= .166, two-tailed. The mean difference was even
smaller (Mdiff = 7.96, SDdiff = 26.66, d = .16), but
the 95% confidence interval was narrower (-3.57 to
19.49) on the scale.
An independent samples t test was performed
comparing the mean Selfdiff scores (Time 1— Time 2)
of the top and bottom 50% of the SIBS scores. No
significant difference between high (M= 8.00,
SD = 39.06, n= 12) and low (M= 16.33,
SD = 27.34, n= 12) religiosity was found,
t(22) = -.605, p = .551, two-tailed. The mean
difference of -8.33 scale units indicated a small
effect (400 point scale range, d = .25), and the 95%
confidence interval around the difference between
group means was wide (-36.88 to 20.21). The
outlier was included in the high religiosity group, and,
therefore, accounts for a more extreme decrease in
ratings and a higher standard deviation.
In order to make the difference between high and
low religiosity more extreme (as well as to exclude
the outlier), the top and bottom third of the SIBS
scores were compared on their mean Selfdiff scores
with another independent samples t test. Still, no
significant difference between high (M= -5.63,
SD = 25.46, n = 8) and low (M= 17.63,
SD = 25.55, n= 8) religiosity was found,
t(14) = -1.823,p = .090, two-tailed. The mean
difference of -23.25 scale units, however, was large
(400 point scale range, d = .91), and the 95%
confidence interval was again wide (-50.60 to 4.10).
Although not significant, the direction of the effect
was, interestingly, opposite of what was expected;
low religiosity individuals decreased their DAS
ratings more so than high religiosity individuals.
Further, a number of exploratory analyses were
conducted. A Pearson's r was conducted to
compare DAS ratings at Time 1, Time 2, and Selfdiff
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(Time 1— Time 2) to SIBS scores. Time 2
compared with SIBS was mildly significant at the
.05 level (r = .424), whereas Time 1 and Selfdiff
compared to SIBS were not significant (r = .398
and -.177, respectively). This shows that
participants' scores on the SIBS were similar to their
DAS religiosity ratings at Time 2 (i.e., higher SIBS
scores were correlated with higher ratings of
religiosity at Time 2). However, the relationship
between participants' scores on the SIBS and
religiosity ratings at Time 1 was weak. Also, no
relationship was found between SIBS scores and
the difference in religiosity ratings.
A bivariate correlation was computed on each of
the rated persons (self, mother figure, father figure,
etc.) at Time 1 and Time 2 to evaluate the
consistency of the religiosity rating. Participants
tended to rate each person similar during the posttest (Time 2) to how they were rated during the pretest (Time 1). All results yielded highly significant
(p < .01) positive correlations, the lowest being for
the participants' ratings of themselves (r = .805).
Further, each rated person was compared to
itself at Time 1 and Time 2 again using a matchedpairs t test to investigate any changes. None of the
results yielded were significant; however, the data on
the mother figure (Mdiff = 10.33, SDdiff = 34.99)
were quite similar to that of the self All other
elements (Dad, Friend, Romantic Partner, and
Dislike) stayed constant from Time 1 to Time 2, with
the largest mean difference being the disliked person
(Mdiff = -4.43).
Bivariate correlations comparing participants'
responses to each question on the SIBS to Selfdiff
ratings were computed. Only two significant
comparisons resulted from these analyses at the .05
level: Selfdiff was negatively correlated with the
questions "I am thankful for all that has happened to
me" and "When I am ashamed of something I have
done, I tell," r = -.446 and -.412, respectively.
An independent samples t test was performed
comparing the mean Selfdiff scores of males and
females. There was no significant difference between
males (M = 15.33, SD = 25.23, n = 9) and females
(M= 10.27, SD = 37.97, n = 15), t(22) = -.354,
p = .726, two-tailed. The mean difference of -5.07
scale units indicated a small effect (400 point scale
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range, d= .15), and the 95% confidence interval
around the difference between group means was
fairly wide (-34.71 to 24.58). As for the other
demographics, a one-way ANOVA did not reveal
any differences in ethnicity or age on the Selfdiff
scores, (p = .742 and .879, respectively).

Discussion
Although the hypothesis of this study was not
supported, it, nonetheless, yielded some interesting
findings. The significant positive correlation of each
individual person at Time 1 and Time 2 showed that
participants did view their religiosity, and the
religiosity of the other persons, in generally the same
direction at Time 2 as they did at Time 1 (i.e., a
person who rated himself as highly religious at Time
1 typically still saw himself higher on the scale at
Time 2). This was consistent with the hypothesis; it
was not expected that participants would rate
themselves as "not religious," only that they would
re-evaluate the magnitude.
However, in comparing the mean difference of
the Dynamic Analog self ratings from Time 1 to Time
2, the re-evaluation was not significant, and so it
cannot be said with any confidence that the overall
slight decrease in rating was anything more than
chance. Also, as mentioned above, there was an
outlier who decreased 109 scale units at Time 2 (half
of the scale). After conducting another analysis on
the data excluding the outlier, the results still were
not significant. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that
there was an influential case causing the overall mean
at Time 2 to drop inordinately. The overall trend of
the data to decrease at Time 2 remained the same to
a lesser degree with the second analysis.
When the sample was divided in half based on
SIBS scores, to create the high and low religiosity
groups, the findings, although not significant, were
opposite of what was anticipated. The high
religiosity group had a mean decrease of 8.00 scale
units lower at Time 2, whereas the low religiosity
group had a mean decrease of 16.33 scale units. To
investigate this further, the sample was divided into
three groups, low, medium, and high, in order to
create a more extreme difference between high and
low. These results, although not significant, were

opposite of the hypothesis as well. The high
religiosity group had a mean difference of 5.63 scale
units higher at Time 2, and the low religiosity group
had a mean difference of 17.63 scale units lower.
It was intriguing that in the more extreme high
religiosity group the scores actually went up at Time
2. As a possible explanation for this behavior, those
who are more religious may be more in tune with
actions or behaviors that are characteristic of being
religious. If this is true, by redoing the DAS ratings
that the experimenter "lost," they were displaying
their good character, which is a result of being a
religious person. After receiving the bad news that
they performed sub-par on the quiz, they may have
overcompensated with this helpful act and rated
themselves higher. It should be noted that the range
of the SIBS scores used in developing the high and
low religiosity groups was quite restricted overall
(see Table 1). All scores were relatively high,
presumably because all participants identified
themselves as Christian, and consequently both the
high and low religiosity groups were relatively high.
It would be beneficial in the future to obtain scores
across the whole range, perhaps by including
individuals of other religions or individuals who do
not hold strong religious convictions.
Another potential issue to be addressed with this
study is construct validity. From the insignificant
correlation of Time 1 to SIBS scores, it can be
assumed that the individuals made some type of
differentiation between religious and spiritual.
(Correlations of SIBS scores with DAS ratings at
Time 1 and Time 2 were both low to moderate,
r = .398 and .424, respectively, thus showing that
they — SIBS scores and DAS ratings — are largely
different.) The DAS ratings used the term religious
and not spiritual, whereas the SIBS used only
spiritual and does not mention religious. Given that
the two concepts of spirituality and religiosity were
merged in this study, the best solution would be to
reword the DAS definition of what a religious
person is to include both religious and spiritual
aspects.
Dealing further with the construct validity, it is
possible that there was no significant re-evaluation of
religiosity from Time 1 to Time 2 because the
feedback was unimportant to the participants. It is

likely that Bible knowledge competence is only one
small portion of what it means as a whole to be
religious. Therefore, it could be advantageous in
ensuring the study is tapping in on the desired
religiosity construct, if more complete backgrounds
of the participants were collected, specifically on
what aspects of being religious they value. For
example, an individual who finds it highly important
to thoroughly know the Bible might respond in line
with the hypothesis, compared to someone who puts
more weight on leading a moral life.
A further aspect of the data that was fascinating
was the analysis of each of the other rated people at
Time 1 and Time 2. The mean difference of all of the
elements was essentially nil (less than 4.50 scale
units), except for Mom (10.33 scale units), whose
mean difference most closely resembled that of the
self (12.17 scale units). This could be explained in
that the majority (62.5%) of the sample was female.
Girls tend to identify themselves more with their
mother figure, and, as a result, a decrease in the Self
could be transferred to whom they feel the most
similar to, causing a similar change in the Mom
rating.
Lastly, each individual question on the SIBS was
correlated to the mean difference of the DAS self
rating. Two of the 26 questions resulted in significant
negative correlations, "I am thankful for all that has
happened to me" and "When I am ashamed of
something I have done, I tell." In understanding the
former correlation, perhaps individuals were thankful
to know an apparent weakness of theirs and
maintained the original ratings with the intent to
improve. Conversely, individuals who were not
thankful for everything may have been unhappy with
the feedback and changed their rating due to
cognitive dissonance. With respect to the latter
question, assuming the feedback made participants
at least mildly ashamed, individuals who tell when
they are ashamed could have maintained their overall
rating of religiosity, knowing and accepting they have
their faults. On the other hand, perhaps individuals
who tend to remain silent when they are ashamed
changed their ratings as a defense, saying that they
have nothing to be ashamed of. On a different note,
it is strange that the question "I probably will not
reexamine my spiritual beliefs" was not correlated to
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whether individuals changed their ratings; one would or f) individuals with more intrinsic versus extrinsic
expect the two to be somewhat correlated.
religious views could be compared. It is apparent
In conclusion, the overall results of this study
that there is still much room for research in this area.
seem to show religiosity as a fixed construct, a
Only after a more thorough basis of research is
finding inconsistent both with this study's hypothesis obtained can more definitive conclusions of one's
as well as research by Laubmeier et al. (2004), who religious identity be drawn.
found one's religiosity after a diagnosis of cancer to
be flexible. The findings here are, however,
References
consistent with Shaffer and Hastings' (2007)
findings, who found that people, especially those
Abela, J.R.Z., & Taylor, G (2003). Specific vulnerwith an authoritarian personality, hold more firmly to
ability to depressive mood reactions in schoolchiltheir religious identity and possess fewer doubts
dren: The moderating role of self-esteem. Journal
when faced with threats. Also, this finding supports
of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology,
previous research on self-esteem, namely that
32, 408-418.
individuals with high self-esteem are less affected by Clore, V., & Fitzgerald, J. (2002). Intentional Faith:
negative events than those with low self-esteem
An alternative view of faith development. Journal
(Kernis et al. 1992; Abela & Taylor, 2003; DeHart
of Adult Development, 9(2), 97-107.
& Pelham, 2007).
DeHart, T., & Pelham, B. (2007). Fluctuations in
There are several aspects of this study that could
state implicit self-esteem in response to daily
be improved in the future. Foremost, this study had
negative events. Journal of Experimental Social
a low level of power, and thus the likelihood of
Psychology, 43,157 -165.
making a Type II error was increased. The
Elam, D. (2001). An Exploration of the relationship
population effect, if in fact there is one, is likely small
between spirituality and emotional well-being.
or medium, and so a larger sample size is warranted Fowler, J. (1991). Stages in faith consciousness.
in future studies in order to uncover any findings.
New Directions for Child Development, 52,
Also, with a restricted range of the SIBS data, only
27-45.
the top portion of the spectrum was represented.
Goldberg, L.R. (1999). A broad-bandwidth, publicAny restricted range comes with the risk of
domain, personality inventory measuring the
attenuated results, further increasing the possibility of
lower-level facets of several five-factor models.
a Type II error. Future studies could replicate the
In I. Mervielde, I. Deary, F. De Fruyt, & F.
present one with a representation of the whole
Ostendorf (Eds.), Personality Psychology in
range, by perhaps adding other religions in the
Europe: Vol. 7 (pp. 7-28). Tilburg, The Netheranalysis.
lands: Tilburg University Press.
Lastly, there are many avenues of research
Grice, J.W. (2002). Idiogrid: Software for the
expanded from the present study that could foster a
management and analysis of repertory grids.
better understanding of one's religious identity in the
Behavior Research Methods, Instruments &
future. For example: a) the sample could be
Computers, 34(3), 338-341.
expanded to include clergy as well as lay persons of Grice, J.W., & Mignogna, M. (2008). The Dynamic
a variety of faiths (other than only Christianity), b)
Analog Scale: A person-centered method for
more figures could be added in the DAS ratings,
single-item measurement. Manuscript under
giving the participant more of an elaborate basis of
review.
comparison (i.e., Jesus, the Pope, Billy Graham,
Hatch, R.L., Burg, M.A., Naberhaus, D.S., &
Satan, the Ideal Self, or the typical Christian), c) the
Hellmich, L.K. (1998). The spiritual involvement
quiz could be made verbal, as opposed to written,
and beliefs scale: Development and testing of a
d) positive feedback could be given, as opposed to
new instrument. Journal of Family Practice, 46,
negative, e) a broader scope of religious values
476-486.
could be used, besides only knowledge of the Bible,
68

Hodges, S. (2002). Mental health, depression, and
dimensions of spirituality and religion. Journal of
Adult Development, 9(2), 109-115.
Kernis, M.H., Grannemann, B.D., & Barclay, L.C.
(1992). Stability of self-esteem: Assessment,
correlates, and excuse making. Journal of
Personality, 60, 621-644.
Keyes, C., & Reitzes, D. (2007). The role of
religious identity in the mental health of older
working and retired adults. Aging & Mental
Health, 11(4), 434-443.
Laubmeier, K., Zakowski, S., & Bair, J. (2004).
The role of spirituality in the psychological adjustment to cancer: A test of the transactional model
of stress and coping. International Journal of
Behavioral Medicine, 11(1), 48-55.
Mullet, E., Barros, J., Frongia, L., Usai, V, &
Shafighi, S. (2003). Religious involvement and the
forgiving personality. Journal of Personality,
71(1), 1-19.
Mystakidou, K., Tsilika, E., Parpa, E., Smyrnioti,
M., & Vlahos, L. (2007). Assessing spirituality
and religiousness in advanced cancer patients.
American Journal of Hospice & Palliative
Medicine, 23(6), 457-463.
Phillips, B. (2004). The awesome book of Bible
trivia. Eugene, OR: Harvest House.
Princeton Religious Research Center. (1996). 1996
report: Will the vitality of the church be the
surprise of the 21" century? Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Religion Research Center.
Shaffer, B., & Hastings B. (2007). Authoritarianism
and religious identification: Response to threats on
religious beliefs. Mental Health, Religion &
Culture, 10(2),151-158.
Tedeschi, R. G., & Calhoun, L. G (2006). Time of
change? The spiritual challenges of bereavement
and loss. Omega. Journal of Death and Dying,
53, 105-116.

69

Table 1
Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale Scores
Participant

Score

Participant

Score

1

100

13

108

2

98

14

110

3

74

15

106

4

102

16

81

5

111

17

110

6

89

18

105

7

96

19

99

8

92

20

117

9

100

21

117

10

103

22

98

11

102

23

91

12

85

24

99

Note. Observed scale range was 74 to 117 on a possible scale range of26 to 130

